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In a recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Yale law professor 
Samuel Moyne laments the failures of “judicialized progressivism.”1  Moyn 
calls for law school reforms to address the fact that they no longer produce 
sufficient “liberal results” to make their training consistent with elite students’ 
social justice ideals.2  The goal of making law schools “staging grounds for 
social change” undermining “unjustifiable hierarchies” requires, in Moyne’s 
view, that law schools train lawyers to “demystify” the “rule of law” (a phrase 
Moyne himself uses only ironically) to show its “disservice to the interests of 
ordinary people.”3  Moyne sees such work as humbling for lawyers because it 
questions the legitimacy of the meritocracy at whose apex they supposedly sit.  
It seems more accurate to say that it places those lawyers who choose his path 
above the meritocracy itself, condemning not their own status, but rather the 
legal order.4  The clear implication is that the moral choice for members of the 
legal profession in both practice and academia is to disrupt legal conventions 
and structures in the name of greater social justice.  Is this the proper attitude 
and goal for lawyers?  My contention here is that this attitude has served to 
undermine and even cause us to forget certain fundamental truths regarding law. 
                                                     
 † Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law, Senior Visiting Fellow, Center for 
the Study of Statesmanship. Thanks are owed to Garrett Robinson (ONU ‘19) for outstanding 
research assistance. 
 1. Samuel Moyn, Law Schools are Bad for Democracy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. 
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These truths include the following: First, for every society, “order is the first 
need of all.”5  People require sustained, consistent rules governing their 
interactions in order to go about their lives in peace.  Those most relevant are 
the fundamental, grounding norms, such as promises must be kept, especially 
when memorialized in contracts, and the state must be looked to primarily as the 
enforcer of settled rules; these norms make peace and civil government 
possible.6  Classical liberal thinkers argued that the only alternative to general 
enforcement of such norms is return to a pre-political “state of nature.”7  Even 
the radical Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who yearned for such a return, 
acknowledged that it would involve destruction of social order and, with it, 
civilization.8 
Second, the laws we all must follow are not and cannot be perfect in any sense; 
they cannot be perfectly rational, wise, effectual, or just.  As products of flawed 
human beings, both laws and legal procedures are liable to mistake and even ill 
will, such that tragedy and injustice will stalk all that we do, even in the halls of 
justice.  The process always will be imperfect; the law always will miss the mark 
of pure justice.9 
Third, as an inescapable consequence of these two basic truths and their 
effects on daily life, there always will be a danger of illegitimacy to the law, and 
hence order in society.  At the very least, political institutions require a Weberian 
brand of political legitimacy whereby the people’s beliefs or confidence lends 
authority to those in positions of power sufficient for them to rule.10  Should the 
people, or even a substantial part thereof, come to believe that the laws are 
merely expressions of power, that they are tools of some ruling class with no 
inclination to serve the common good, social trust will disintegrate.  Law and 
social order will soon follow, leading to either revolution or chaos, in which only 
force and fraud can rule.11 
                                                     
 5. See RUSSEL KIRK, ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER (3d. ed., Regnery, 1991). 
 6. The first proposition is the foundation of Thomas Hobbes’ theory of social organization.  
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 79–88 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 1994).  The second 
proposition is John Locke’s justification and explanation for the formation of civil government.  
See JOHN LOCK, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–14 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett 1980). 
 7. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 6, at 106.  Hobbes calls the state of nature a “condition of 
war” upon which the commonwealth is a “restraint.”  Id. 
 8. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Essay on the Origins of Inequality, in ROUSSEAU’S 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 55 (Julia Conaway Bondanella trans., Alan Ritter & Julia Conaway 
Bondanella eds., Norton 1988) (1754). 
 9. See infra discussion of Augustine, below. 
 10. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 34 (Rodney 
Livingstone trans., David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Hackett 2004). 
 11. As remarked by Russell Kirk,”[t]he good society is marked by a high degree of order, 
justice, and freedom.  Among these, order has primacy: for justice cannot be enforced until a 
tolerable civil social order is attained, nor can freedom be anything better than violence until order 
gives us laws.”  KIRK, supra note 5, at 6. 
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My contention is that lawyers have willfully forgotten these truths.  The how 
and why are as simple as they are contested: many lawyers, both secular and 
religious, prefer to practice law as political advocacy because in this way they 
can see themselves as warriors for social justice.  Unfortunately, their practice 
rests on deliberate ignorance of law’s nature as a flawed, limited, but necessary 
tool for maintaining order, rather than a means of making society truly, fully 
just.  Consistently denied success in their utopian endeavors, lawyers respond 
not by rethinking those endeavors, but by calling into question the legitimacy of 
law.  Some might consider the motivating factor here to be disappointment or 
righteous anger.  It seems more accurate, however, to see it as a dangerous, 
overweening pride causing one to refuse to rethink one’s own presuppositions 
in light of experience.  The antidote to this problem is a resuscitation of that old 
Christian virtue of humility.  Here I begin with a brief discussion of the nature 
of humility as a virtue.  I proceed to examine the radical critique of law in its 
most overtly political, secular forms.  I then lay out the elements of radical 
political theology which I argue undergird radical legal critiques of both secular 
and religious varieties.  I proceed to a more detailed discussion of the political 
theology provided by the radical (and much beloved) Catholic lawyer Thomas 
Shaffer.  In the section that follows I use the work of Saint Augustine, as well as 
observations on the nature and limits of law taken from legal practice, to show 
the intrinsic weaknesses of Shaffer’s perspective and its secular offshoots.  I then 
build on this critique through an examination, perhaps surprisingly, of the 
practical necessity of humility assumed by the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (MPRC).  I close with some observations on the necessity of Christian 
attitudes and virtues to encourage humility and the humble but necessary 
lawyerly task of helping people get on with their lives without disturbing 
fundamental social peace. 
I. THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY 
All persons and professions need virtue.  The ancient Greek philosopher 
Aristotle pointed out that a virtue in an important sense is merely an excellence.12  
The virtue of the eye is to see well, and the virtue of a war horse is to carry its 
owner into battle without flinching.13  Virtues are not merely discrete good 
things, however; they are elements making up a good eye, a good horse, or a 
good person.  For persons in particular, this means virtue is what enables us to 
lead good lives. 
Concern with human virtue is concern with morality—with the pursuit of what 
is good in the sense of fulfilling the person’s nature as a moral being.  To fulfill 
one’s nature is to act (and not merely to think) well.  One becomes a good person 
by acting well; just as one more specifically becomes a good carpenter by 
                                                     
 12. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 30 (Roger Crisp trans. and ed., Cambridge, 2000). 
 13. Id. 
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practicing the building of bookshelves and the like with the discipline and care 
necessary to perform well at such tasks.14  Virtues are habits of conduct that lead 
us to excellence in our endeavors, within the bounds set by that great virtue, 
justice.15 
All of this may sound quite divorced from the seemingly passive and retiring 
practice of humility.  Aristotle himself did not even see humility as a virtue.  
Instead, Aristotle praised “greatness of soul.”16  This greatness of soul was the 
golden mean between vanity and pusillanimity—between excessive pride, 
especially in one’s looks or other superficial qualities, and timidity, lack of spirit, 
or simple cowardice.  Humility may seem to be a somewhat peculiar kind of 
virtue because it is rooted in restraint.  Courage and justice, for example, clearly 
are about developing one’s inner capacities—about expressing and building 
upon inner strengths in an outward fashion.  Humility, on the other hand, is a 
virtue rooted in a Christian conception of the person and moral action.  It may 
be seen as similar to another cardinal virtue, temperance.17  Both these virtues 
have as much to do with restraining as expressing oneself.  Humility requires 
other-directedness, recognition of one’s own limits, the legitimacy of authority 
and existing structures, and the worth of other people and other people’s 
opinions. 
None of this means that humility is self-abnegation; its roots lie in a realistic 
assessment of one’s own worth and a willingness to give credit where it is due 
and to listen to others.  Humility provides a path to effective common action and 
success, and that path is built on respect for the goals and values of other people, 
our own limits, and the authority of overarching values and institutions.  
Greatness of spirit may be seen as best capturing the crusading lawyer’s vision 
of what he or she ought to be.  But humility, a somewhat more modest virtue, 
better captures the disposition most helpful to the law (as a system especially), 
to clients, and to the profession.  At the very least, it is regrettable that lawyers 
have lost sight of the necessity of humility as a core element in their own proper 
disposition. 
II. THE SECULAR CRITIQUE 
Rejection of humility is of a piece with rejection of the law as it exists.  By 
this I do not mean that one lacks virtue any time one questions any law, perceives 
its imperfections, or seeks to improve it.  To seek justice is itself virtuous.  
Moreover, the law always is less than perfect.  Saint Thomas Aquinas, for 
                                                     
 14. Id. at 23. 
 15. For a recent formulation of the practices in which virtues are formed, see ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187 (3d ed. 1981). 
 16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 68–69. 
 17. So much is the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.  See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA 1a 2ae q. 61 a. 2-3 847–48 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1981). 
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example, pointed out that all particular human laws contain elements of 
injustice.  But he also observed that an unjust law is crooked, or misses the mark 
of fulfilling its proper nature, which is to bring justice.18  That is, the problem is 
not that law lacks the virtue of justice, but that all human laws, being the products 
of sinful humans, fail to embody fully the virtue of justice.  One may see pride 
as a necessary spur to reform and improve particular laws (thus, Aristotle’s 
preference for greatness).19  My point, here, is that lawyers in recent decades 
have so vigorously worked to undermine law and our legal structures as to place 
themselves above the law, delegitimizing this essential social good. 
The radicalism of contemporary legal critiques seems self-evident.  
Academics in particular condemn law today, not as imperfect, but as 
systemically “racist, sexist, and homophobic.”20  In the classroom, Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) are among the most obvious 
examples of theories positing the illegitimacy of the American (and Western) 
legal system.21  But CLS and CRT build on a lengthy practice of radical 
lawyering rooted in an earlier form of ideology denying our legal system’s 
legitimacy. 
Before CLS and CRT gained prominence, various forms of radical lawyering, 
generally associated with Marxist critiques of the American system, already 
were well ensconced among academics and the crusading progressive bar.  One 
may take, for example, the career of Monroe Freedman.  As both academic (seen 
during his day as the dean of professional responsibility teachers)22 and activist 
legal practitioner, Freedman presented a thoroughgoing critique of American 
law and a determination to take radical steps to protect the power and autonomy 
of clients.  Central to Freedman’s career was his conviction that lawyers should 
actively engage in furthering their clients’ lies as a means of increasing the 
autonomy of those he deemed oppressed and of undermining what he saw as the 
illegitimate power structures of our society.23  According to Freedman, law is 
power, and those who face the power of what he saw as a class-based structure 
                                                     
 18. BRUCE P. FROHNEN & GEORGE W. CAREY, CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND THE RISE 
OF QUASI-LAW 37–38 (2016). 
 19. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 68–69. 
 20. This is far from a marginal position within the legal academy.  See Mark Tushnet, Critical 
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L. J. 1515, 1519 (1919) (noting that it is normal for 
law school faculty to have at least “one, but not more than one” scholar of CLS). 
 21. For an introduction to CRT, see Introduction in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS 
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii–xxxii (Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller & Thomas eds., 1995); for an 
example of CLS, see Aaron Samsel, Toward a Synthesis: Law as Organizing, 18 CUNY L. REV. 375 
(2015) (encouraging the use of law to undo systems of “oppression”). 
 22. Norman I. Silber, Monroe Freedman and the Morality of Dishonesty: Multidimensional 
Legal Ethics as a Cold War Imperative, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1127–28 (2016). 
 23. Id. at 1152–53. 
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of oppression deserve to be aided in their struggle for autonomy, including by 
furthering perjury.24 
Freedman exemplified his political orientation when he wrote in defense of 
the nineteenth-century British lawyer, Lord Brougham.25  In his defense of 
British Queen Caroline on the charge of adultery, Brougham stated that: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in 
all the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all 
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons…is 
his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard 
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon 
others.  Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he 
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.26 
This statement according to Freedman sums up the proper role of the advocate—
to take the client’s side with unstinting vigor, whatever the consequences.  
According to Freedman, Brougham’s critics are wrong to see him as 
irresponsible, arrogant, and self-serving for his speech and action in Queen 
Caroline’s case.  Brougham was, rather, a great man because he sought justice 
throughout his career, particularly in his pursuit of the abolition of slavery.27  
Freedman overlooks the question whether either Brougham’s political positions 
or his extreme statement of the adversary ethic are relevant to, let alone 
justificatory to, his actual conduct as a lawyer.  Brougham’s “defense” of Queen 
Caroline put her at needless risk for her life and fomented anti-Catholic hatred 
and even violence against the King and others on account of the King’s first, 
clandestine marriage to a Catholic.28 
Caroline was the victim of an “advocate” more concerned with advancing his 
political interests than with protecting the interests of his client.  The story of the 
correspondence and provocations encouraged by Brougham through his whip-
hand representation of Caroline has been told in detail.29  It involves the 
subjugation of his client’s interests to a perception of justice as political victory.  
Had Brougham pursued his client’s interests rather than his own political 
program, which would be benefitted by damaging the King’s reputation, the 
proceedings would not have commenced at all; in this regard Brougham went so 
far as to hide from his client that there had been a settlement offer to her from 
                                                     
 24. Id. 
 25. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1213, 1213–14 (2005). 
 26. JOSEPH NIGHTINGALE, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821). 
 27. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1214. 
 28. Id. at 1215. 
 29. Id. at 1214. 
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the King.30  As to the speech itself, Brougham acknowledged later that it was 
not intended as a summary of the proper role of an advocate; it was simply a 
threat—as the graymail for which Freedman praised him.31  Freedman praises 
Brougham’s use of “graymail” (the threat of exposing the details of the King’s 
private affairs) to intimidate Caroline’s prosecutors into dropping their case.32  
But the graymail itself was necessitated by Brougham’s misuse of his client for 
his own political purposes. 
Freedman was a revolutionary in the overt sense that he wanted to dismantle 
and replace what he saw as an illegitimate legal, constitutional, and political 
order.33  CLS and CRT are embodiments of this rejection of legitimacy; they rest 
on the presumption that American law is so deeply rooted in oppression that it 
cannot be reformed.34  They call for wholesale rejection and replacement of that 
law, and even replacement of the Western conception of law itself.35  Their goal 
is a narrative-based practice of adjudication that takes into account the particular 
experiences of specific persons, determined, for example, by their race.36  That 
is, they take the maxim that law entails treating like cases alike as a starting point 
for denying the “likeness” of cases according to their own categories of relevant 
actors (e.g., race, sex, and sexual orientation).  Law then becomes something 
other than itself because it must be perceived, shaped, and applied according to 
postmodern rules eschewing traditional conceptions of merit, fault, and 
blameworthiness in favor of treatment according to categories of victimization.  
Justice, then, becomes what supports the narrative of oppression and the cause 
of bringing down existing structures. 
III. POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
How did such uncompromising critiques of the American legal system 
become part of the academic mainstream?  Much of the utopian pressure on law 
has been secular in tone and justification.  But I want to focus here on its 
specifically Christian elements.  Why?  First, because radical Christian critiques 
predate their secular corollaries.  Second, because a certain strand of Christian 
lawyering, specifically the blending of religious and political activism, has been 
                                                     
 30. Michael Ariens, Brougham’s Ghost, 35 NORTHERN ILL. L. REV. 263, 267–74 (2015). 
 31. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1217. 
 32. The case was held in the House of Lords as part of attempts to pass a law that would have 
stripped Caroline of her title; proponents of the bill, which passed in the Lords, let the matter drop 
without pursuing it in the House of Commons. 
 33. Freedman was a member of the pro-Communist National Lawyers Guild and, while his 
characterizations of his involvement in that group varied, he openly supported radical action to 
produce revolutionary change.  See Silber, supra note 22, at 1140–46. 
 34. Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality & the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the 
Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REV. 787, 797, 803 (1999). 
 35. Id. at 803. 
 36. Id. at 806. 
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crucial to the degradation of law in America, largely by convincing people that, 
in Eric Voegelin’s terms, we can “immanentize the eschaton” or bring about a 
secular version of heaven on earth.37 
Christian legal activists, like their secular counterparts, would deny that they 
are seeking utopia; perfection is, after all, unattainable almost by definition.  But 
this is no answer to the charge that they seek more from law than it can by nature 
provide by seeking more justice, and of a specific sort, than human nature and 
the nature of justice itself allow.  Neither does it answer the charge that they are 
so engrossed in the task of radical critique, of undermining imperfect structures, 
that they have lost sight of both the fragility and the necessity of legal order. 
A political theology may be defined merely as an attempt to put the dictates 
of one’s religion into political practice.  But the point of a political theology is 
to make one’s theological beliefs concrete, that is, to apply religious precepts in 
a way that transforms society through political means.  Examples of political 
theology are legion, though they have their roots in political, rather than 
narrowly legal arguments.  Gustavo Gutierrez, a leader in the Marxist/Catholic 
movement of Liberation Theology, denied that his movement sought political 
liberation as, in effect, the coming of the kingdom of God.38  But his explanation 
is telling: 
The growth of the Kingdom is a process which occurs historically in 
liberation, insofar as liberation means a greater fulfillment of man.  
Liberation is a precondition for the new society, but this is not all it is.  
While liberation is implemented in liberating historical events, it also 
denounces their limitations and ambiguities, proclaims their 
fulfillment, and impels them effectively towards total communion.  
This is not an identification.  Without liberating historical events, there 
would be no growth of the Kingdom.  But the process of liberation 
will not have conquered the very roots of oppression and the 
exploitation of man by man without the coming of the Kingdom, 
which is above all a gift.39 
In effect, for Gutierrez, political liberation is a necessary condition for 
salvation.  The coming of the Kingdom is a gift, but that gift is in addition to, or 
a kind of capstone to, the growth of the Kingdom resulting from liberation.  In 
this, liberation theology mimics an earlier, protestant movement—that of the 
“Social Gospel.”  The Social Gospel movement was (and is) “post-millennial” 
in that it sees establishment of the kingdom of God on Earth as a necessary 
precursor to the second coming of Christ.40  Indeed, according to its most 
                                                     
 37. See ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 166–67 (1952). 
 38. GUSTAVO A. GUTIÉRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 176–77 (Sr. Caridad Inda & John 
Eagleson eds., trans., 1973). 
 39. Id. at 177. 
 40. WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 226 (1917). 
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influential theorist, Walter Rauschenbusch, “The Kingdom of God is humanity 
organized according to the will of God.”41  Existing both in the present and in 
the future, the Kingdom of God is not only eschatological reality; it is “always 
coming, always pressing in on the present, always big with possibility, and 
always inviting immediate action.”42  To establish the Kingdom of God, social 
movements must act to “redeem” social life from bigotry and all forms of 
oppression, including private property.43 
Political theology, then, naturally leads to radical activism.  Such activism 
itself may eschew theology properly understood in favor of ideology, but the 
terrestrial results are much the same.  Russell Kirk defined ideology as “a 
dogmatic political theory which is an endeavor to substitute secular goals and 
doctrines for religious goals and doctrines; and which promises to overthrow 
present dominations so that the oppressed may be liberated.  Ideology’s promises 
are…’political messianism.’”44  The ideologue promises salvation in this world 
through human action that harnesses the holy to terrestrial ends.  Ideology is 
religious in nature, but it substitutes demands that the state bring salvation to the 
here and now for a metaphysical understanding of human limitations and the 
human yearning for an existence available only in the presence of God.  In 
Augustinian terms, ideology mistakenly sees law as a means by which we can 
leave the sinful City of Man and enter the eternal City of God.45 
IV. SHAFFER’S CHRISTIAN CALL TO DISORDER 
Shaffer has had a long, selfless career seeking to act as what he calls a 
Christian Gentleman in his professional life.46  One might say that Shaffer serves 
as a kind of prophet, calling on the rich and powerful to repent and return to the 
ways of the Lord.47  Indeed, Shaffer self-consciously seeks to pattern his life, 
and convince others to pattern their lives, on that of the biblical prophets.48 
                                                     
 41. Id. at 142. 
 42. Id. at 141. 
 43. Id. at 143. 
 44. RUSSEL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 5 (1993). 
 45. RUSSEL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 163 (4th ed. 2004). 
Augustine rejected these notions.  The state is governed by men, subject to sinful 
appetites—enslaved especially by the lust of power.  On looking at the history of any 
people, one perceives how, despite heroic endeavors by some few good and strong men, 
any state soon is riddled with corruption.  Put no faith in salvation through political 
order. 
Id. 
 46. Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be Saved?  The Theological Legal Ethics of Thomas 
Shaffer, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 347–48 (1993). 
 47. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 469, 469 (2003). 
 48. See id.; Silber, supra note 22, at 1130 (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, A Consideration of 
the Political Thought of the Early Jews (Apr. 11, 1951) (unpublished A.B. honors thesis, Harvard 
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Shaffer’s argument is rooted in the useful truism that too many people today 
are too materially comfortable to pay sufficient attention to justice—both its 
necessity for a good life and its perpetual lack, particularly in dealings with the 
poor.49  Part of the broader problem clearly has to do with power and its potential 
misuse; as Shaffer puts it, “[l]ethal state power evicts my clients from their 
homes, garnishes their wages, and deports them.”50  Shaffer’s rather extreme 
restatement of the problem of power owes much to his agreement with the 
statement that “[t]he modern nation-state is a fundamentally unjust and corrupt 
set of institutions whose primary function is to preserve the interests of the ruling 
class, by coercive and violent means if necessary...And...there will always come 
a time when it is necessary.”51 
Given that, in Shaffer’s view, the cards are stacked definitively against the 
poor, as the powerful use law for their own ends, what solution does he offer?  
Like Freedman, Shaffer rejects the mere correction of abuses; after all, he sees 
the nation as fundamentally unjust and corrupt.  What is needed, then, is 
prophecy—religiously inspired activism.  Here Shaffer cites Walter 
Brueggemann, who argues that prophecy means to show “that a thinkable 
alternative can be imagined, characterized, and lived in.”52  Shaffer’s prophecy, 
then, is political-theological.  The link between theology, politics, and ideology 
and law is found in the specific context of ancient Israel.  As Shaffer argues, “the 
biblical prophets should be read in reference not only to observation and 
intuition but to the social, political, and economic system established in the 
Torah—an ‘ideal pattern of economic life embodied in the Law’”53  Ancient 
Israel is Shaffer’s explicit (if idealized) model; one he seeks to reconstitute in 
modernity. 
When the Prophets spoke of justice, those to whom they spoke knew 
what the prophets meant; they shared a Jewish passion for justice.  
They shared in their families their pondering about what to do about 
widows and orphans and immigrants.  The prophets spoke at home.  
And they were among a priestly people, reminding a priestly people 
of the mandate the Lord had given their family and their families to 
proclaim Jewish justice to the nations.54 
Ancient Israel, for Shaffer, is more than an interesting historical oddity.  It is 
a model, and more than a model, for in a sense Israel, its problems, and its call 
                                                     
University) (on file with the Pusey Library, Harvard University)).  Freedman himself wrote an 
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to prophecy, always is with us.  In Shaffer’s view, prophets around the world 
and up to the present day are called “to challenge, criticize, and subvert legal 
power in Israel.”55  Shaffer continues, “This is the way the God of the Bible set 
up the law—in perpetual tension.  Order on one end, subversion on the other.”56  
Such tension may be a creative and even essential means of conservation.57  
Shaffer’s radical political argument relates directly to lawyers because, he 
argues, “biblical prophets are sources of legal ethics...the biblical prophets were 
lawyers more than anything else.”58  Shaffer mixes law, religion, and politics in 
pursuit of radical transformation.  He laments that “[m]aybe one reason 
[American lawyer-prophets] do not get put in our legal-ethics texts is that they 
are too stridently focused, as their biblical counterparts were, on the practice of 
law (the practice of biblical prophecy) as communal concern for social 
justice….[they] aim to be relentlessly radical.”59  The legal structures Shaffer 
points to as proper objects of radical transformation are numerous and central to 
the structure of society: rules governing families, land ownership, relations with 
strangers and visitors, and rules properly aimed at opposing profiteering money 
lenders and other exploiters.60 
Shaffer presents a radical, activist antinomianism.  His prophets “sought 
social revolution and called for transformation….When they were lawyers, they 
practiced law against order.”61  Law is practiced against order when used to 
transform society and undermine antecedents of legality such as like treatment 
for like cases (e.g., across class boundaries).  More than anything, Shaffer is 
preaching against the rule of tradition—of settled norms not susceptible to direct 
political action.  He bemoans that “communal life has not only become private 
and unpolitical; it has also become ‘peripheral.’  Our worshiping communities 
are not at the center of things as much as they once were.”62  The answer, then, 
is full integration of political theology with law. 
V. THE DANGERS OF LAWYERLY THEOLOGY 
Shaffer’s views on law and theology are well summed up by the 
announcement for a conference on law and religion held in 2017.  The 
announcement summarizes an allegory taken from Shaffer’s American Lawyers 
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and their Communities.63  Here we encounter Shaffer’s vision of a downtown 
street: 
On one side of the street is a house of worship, on the other is a 
courthouse.  According to Shaffer, law schools train lawyers to look 
at the religious congregation from the courthouse—that is to analyze 
the problems the religious congregation creates for the law.  Law 
schools ignore the possibility that there might be a view of the 
courthouse from the house of worship.  Prophetic witness is 
discounted in law teaching.  Our part of the academy, more than any 
other, has systematically discouraged and disapproved of invoking the 
religious tradition as important or even interesting.  It ignores the 
community of the faithful so resolutely that even its students who have 
come to law school from the community of the faithful learn to look 
at the [religious congregation] from the courthouse, rather than at the 
courthouse from [the religious congregation].64 
In this passage, we encounter Shaffer’s argument that the law, in a separate 
building from religion, may be viewed in a different light from outside its own 
walls.  That light will show the law’s flaws and the need for lawyers themselves 
to choose new standards of conduct.  But Shaffer does not seek to understand 
the law from the vantage point of the church; rather, he sees law and church as 
intertwined within an atmosphere that is overwhelmingly political. 
Shaffer quotes Randy Cohen with approval: 
The difference between ethics and politics seems to me 
artificial…Often the only way to achieve an individual ethical goal is 
through group endeavor—i.e., politics….An ethics that 
eschewed…nominally political questions would not be ethics at all, 
but mere rule-following.  It would be the ethics of the slave dealer, 
advocating that one always be honest about a slave’s health and always 
pay bills promptly.65 
The lawyer who refuses to abandon the distinction between group endeavor and 
politics, and who merely serves clients within the system, according to Cohen 
and Shaffer, has the ethics of a “slave dealer.”66 
It is true that law and religion occupy different buildings, in Shaffer’s terms, 
within that city in which we as Americans, and as inheritors of the intertwined 
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Anglo-American traditions of law and religion, dwell.67  Moreover, both 
buildings are close enough and important enough that what happens in each, and 
especially what the denizens of each do when they enter the public square, 
affects us all.  But the buildings remain separate for good reason; law and 
religion, like law and politics, each have their own institutions, beliefs, and 
practices guiding conduct within their spheres of authority.  Importantly, the 
purpose of those trained in the law is different from, and aimed at lower, more 
basic goods, than that for which the house of worship by nature exists.  From a 
Christian perspective, lawyers and ministers seek the same end-goals of virtue 
in this life and beatitude in the next.  But where the house of worship by nature 
forms communities in which people learn to live the Gospel, law at best can only 
help the house of worship by protecting it against wrongdoers, including an 
overreaching, intolerant state and activist lawyers who work to undermine the 
settled rules necessary for any community to exist. 
Order is the first need of all.  Without settled rules regarding what we can 
expect from one another—what we may use and how, where we may go and 
what we may do there, for example—we will not be able to go about our lives.  
Our every move may bring conflict and even violence.  Classical liberal theorists 
with their “state of nature” theory did not describe actual circumstances under 
which people generally lived but rather the necessity of settled rules for social 
and political life.  Those same thinkers understood that the customary rules of 
pre-political life must be solidified into the rule of law if sustained liberty is to 
be possible.  In this they, like the framers of our own Constitution, were building 
on long-sustained understandings of the importance of stability for human 
flourishing—an understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas thought required extreme 
caution before moving to replace even bad rulers.68  Bad rulers—and bad laws—
may be replaced by even worse ones or, what is worst of all, chaos. 
The importance of stability is highlighted by law’s own limited nature.  
Society, like those who make it up, always will fail to achieve true justice and, 
given free reign, may well inflict extreme injustice even with law, let alone 
without it.  Augustine highlights law’s limitations by noting the inevitability of 
injustice even on fundamental issues.  He points to the “pitiable predicament of 
men who sit in judgment on other men without being able to read their 
consciences[.]”69  Judges in Augustine’s time would struggle, even engaging in 
torture as they attempted to prove guilt or innocence, often making mistakes.70 
Law and legal procedures remain radically imperfect and attempts to make 
them more perfect have caused the system itself to bend, if not break.  Refusing 
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to convict a rapist because his “cultural norms” make it unjust to hold him 
responsible for his actions undermines justice for his victim (in this case a victim 
who subsequently attempted suicide) and the system of justice for society as a 
whole.71  More generally, a hyper-complex legal structure implementing an 
increasingly complex set of laws and regulations, all aimed at achieving ever-
greater levels of fairness, has undermined actual persons’ chances for reasonably 
just treatment.  For evidence we may look to the fact that the vast majority of 
criminal cases today never even go to trial; innocent and guilty alike are herded 
into a system in which they must “bargain” with an increasingly powerful state 
to determine whether or how much they will be punished.72 
In the end, the attempt to use law as a tool of social reconstruction destroys it.  
For example, demands that lawsuits and political action be used to force changes 
in federal regulations so as to promote a just society, along with attempts by 
judges and legislatures to impose strict and detailed rules on crime and tort have 
given us, not more justice, but less law.  Everything is subject to plea bargains 
and settlements, not trial.  Radical lawyers may see this as progress because it 
undermines legal forms in favor of progressive agreement rooted in conceptions 
of social justice.  But the sides really are not even, especially for a poor person 
whose case is of insufficient political use to attract a powerful “public interest” 
advocate.  The state retains the power and those who are politically connected 
secure more “justice” than those who are not. 73 
Law is necessary in that we cannot live together in even relative peace and 
order without it.  But the law is highly imperfect, visiting pain upon the innocent 
even as it leaves the guilty free to commit more crimes.  Augustine pointed this 
out and went on to argue that it does not mean that we should give up on the law, 
or that we should seek to perfect it.  Rather, we must recognize law’s limits, 
value it for what it does achieve, and look elsewhere for additional assistance in 
seeking peace.74 
The law which is made to govern states seems to you to make many 
concessions and to leave unpunished things which are avenged 
nonetheless by divine providence—and rightly so.  But because it does 
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not do all things, it does not thereby follow that what it does do is to 
be condemned.75 
Augustine’s answer to the tragedy of law is not itself law; nor is it a rejection 
of law.  It is an addition to the law in the form of mercy.  Augustine does not 
call the law into question, but merely recognizes its limits.  He notes that Jesus, 
in saying to those who would stone the adulteress that he who is without sin 
should cast the first stone, is not denying law.  Jesus here recognizes the justice 
of law.  Rather than call it into question, he adds to it recognition of our own 
sinfulness, a recognition that should bring out in those with the power to punish 
a mercy that too often remains dormant.76  As Augustine wrote to one prosecutor, 
“There is good, then, in your severity which works to secure our tranquility, and 
there is good in our [priestly] intercession which works to restrain your 
severity.”77 
Augustine’s “solution” to law’s imperfection is highly limited; mercy cannot 
replace justice, instead only mitigating its severity, and it must be applied 
persistently and watched over lest man’s imperfections delegitimize mercy 
itself.  Nevertheless, mercy remains necessary and applicable to regular legal 
process.  For Augustine, mercy is the part of the Church, the role of bishops and 
priests as intercessors, adding to, rather than replacing, the role of the adversaries 
in judicial process.78  Even mercy, when applied by men, is highly imperfect; 
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priests, too, may believe lies, misjudge character, and be mistaken regarding 
facts and circumstances.  But law tempered by mercy (seen in today’s system in 
the pardoning power) is the best we can hope for in this life, within the City of 
Man. 
Here it may seem that I am merely making a great deal out of Augustine’s 
recognition of the imperfections of criminal procedure and the necessity of 
mercy within a society that recognizes the universality of human sin.  But this 
extends to what I would insist is a separate realm—politics, and what properly 
results from politics, namely, public policy.  For Augustine also recognized the 
limitations of law to achieve good public policy.  Thus, he famously 
recommended against laws punishing prostitution because they would be 
impossible of proper enforcement and engage the state in breaking up even 
healthy social relations (something particularly of danger in a time before police 
forces).79  Thus, again, a tragic recognition of the limits of law in seeking justice 
and the common good (peace, including in eternal life) is necessary for such 
good as can be achieved in this life.80 
One might engage here in an extensive discussion of the proper forms of 
public policy, be they liberal, conservative, socialist, or libertarian.  But my point 
is precisely that such a discussion misses the point.  No political system will 
establish a truly just society because no such society is attainable in this life.  
Disagreements concerning particular policy choices, providing they are 
peaceful, are in fact healthy—they evidence a desire and practice of public 
discourse aimed at the public good.  But they must be engaged in within an 
understanding of the limited capacity of law.  Law cannot bear the weight of 
policies aimed at enforcing any particular vision of society; it at best can 
maintain public peace while more natural, local, pre-legal groups bear the 
greatest responsibility for helping their members work out their own lives.81  
                                                     
life for correcting morals; whatever anyone has sought out for himself in this life, the 
same will he have after it.  Consequently, we are forced by our love for humankind to 
intercede for the guilty lest they end this life by punishment, only to find that punishment 
does not end with this life. 
Id. at 120. 
 79. See David A. J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral 
Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1211 n.89 (1979). 
 80. Augustine notes: 
In this life the wrong of evil possessors is endured and among them certain laws are 
established which are called civil laws, not because they bring men to make a good use 
of their wealth, but because those who make bad use of it become thereby less injurious.  
This comes about either because some of them become faithful and fervent—and these 
have a right to all things—or because those who live among them are not hampered by 
their evil deeds, but are tested until they come to that City where they are heirs to eternity, 
where the just alone have a place, the wise alone leadership, and those who are there 
possess what is truly their own. 
Augustine, Letter 93, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note 69, at 13031. 
 81. This is merely a limited restatement of the principle of subsidiarity. 
2020] The Lost Virtue of Humility 17 
Thus, a humble recognition of law’s limits, combined with a humble recognition 
of the capacity of and need for other social forms and norms to further the 
common good, is necessary for the achievement of a decent, stable, and lasting 
society. 
VI. MRPC: A SYSTEM REQUIRING AND ALLOWING FOR HUMILITY 
Discussions of political theology and the City of God do not transition easily 
into an examination of the MRPC.  Nor is it clear why or how one would look 
to the MRPC as a source of virtue, let alone the virtue of humility.  But my goal 
in examining the MRPC is quite limited: to show that even much generalized, 
low-level norms intended to protect the profession of law support and require 
humility on the part of lawyers.  Indeed, the MRPC illustrates how humility is 
an integral lawyerly virtue—one necessary for engaging in the profession with 
even a modicum of personal responsibility and recognition of our duty to the 
common good. 
At a superficial level, it would be difficult to find much in the MRPC that 
supports a call to humility.  There is competency and diligence (Preamble, 4 and 
Rule 1.1);82 providing guidance and care for clients under a disability;83 and 
acting in the role of advisor.84  All these standards of conduct laid out in the 
MRPC seem to emphasize the need for lawyers to be self-possessed, competent, 
and willing to take the lead in providing service. 
Section 6 of the Preamble goes further.  Here the MRPC urges lawyers to 
“seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of 
justice and the quality of service.”85  This section also urges lawyers to “cultivate 
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, [and] employ that knowledge in 
reform of the law.”86  In addition to these calls to reform the system, Section 6 
calls on lawyers to “further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the 
rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional 
democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
authority.”87  That is, the MRPC directs lawyers to take on roles as educators of 
the public as a whole, motivating them to embrace and support juridical 
democracy.  The lawyer’ duties, according to Section 6, go beyond teaching and 
motivating to using their own “civic influence to ensure equal access to our 
system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot 
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afford or secure adequate legal counsel.”88  In sum, lawyers, at least in the eyes 
of the MRPC, are leading citizens with the right and duty to martial public forces 
for the public interest, which is identified with a powerful, respected legal 
system. 
The duties spelled out in the MRPC’s conception of the lawyer as public 
citizen rest on the notion that lawyers do or at least should know what is best for 
the justice system, for the rule of law, and for the citizenry.  Regardless of its 
truth or value, this statement clearly is a call to pride—to an expansive vision 
and to the application of this vision to the public at large.  But this call to pride 
is, or at least should be, shaped, mitigated, and at times trumped by the systemic 
necessity for lawyerly humility.  Lawyers’ core duty to provide service to clients 
whose goals are rightfully deemed paramount and to be determined by 
themselves (within the confines of the law) brings with it a set of requirements 
that point to the necessity of the virtue of humility. 
Broadly understood, the MRPC points toward an understanding of humility 
as an excellence appropriate and even necessary for lawyers.  To begin with, the 
MRPC is based in a relationship of service.  Rule 1.2 makes this clear in stating 
that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation.”89  The lawyer does not get to dictate to the client what the client 
should be attempting to accomplish.  The lawyer’s job is to help clients pursue 
their own goals.  This seems obvious enough, but we should keep in mind that 
it points toward the lawyer subjecting his or her own judgment on a very 
important, directive set of issues, to that of the client.  No Broughams need apply 
to the bar of responsible lawyers. 
The Rules’ preamble, also rooted in the nature of the profession, points to the 
need for lawyers to “demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who 
serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials.”90 
This imperative is reinforced in a number of provisions, including those 
requiring meritorious claims and contentions (3.1),91 efforts to expedite 
litigation (3.2),92 candor toward the tribunal (3.3),93 fairness toward opposing 
parties and counsel (3.4),94 and respect for the rights of third persons (4.4).95 
All these considerations go to the need for lawyers to respect those with whom 
they deal, particularly in litigation, but in all other aspects of law as well.  Worth 
emphasizing here is the sense in which this respect rests on, as it also should 
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reinforce, a basic humility on the part of the lawyer that itself is rooted in the 
nature and limits of law.  Perhaps some or even most attorneys in the midst of 
daily practice view MRPC-type rules as mere guidelines for avoiding contempt 
citations.  Nevertheless, virtues themselves are dispositions born of conduct; that 
is, they are habits rooted in action as well as rational consideration.  A 
disposition of respect, even if often rooted in fear, combines easily with 
acceptance of the overall goals of the system in which one serves. 
Thus, the imperative of judicial efficiency and recognition that bad conduct 
endangers the system on which one (and one’s clients) relies encourages one to 
work to keep the system functioning, in part through humble self-restraint and 
recognition of the rights of others.  One restrains oneself from following one’s 
instinct to engage in scorched-earth tactics that may produce victory but will 
undermine the legal system.  One also acts out of respect for the judgment, rights, 
and even authority of others, especially judges and rules of discovery and the 
like which are designed to maintain the system and further its internal goals. 
More generally, the lawyer’s service role demands humility.  For example, to 
believe one’s client at times requires suspension of one’s judgment.  One is 
giving the benefit of the doubt—at times even when that doubt is relatively 
great—to one’s client.  One does not simply follow one’s own reason but adapts 
it to find the reason in one’s client’s story.  This can go for contract negotiations, 
for example, but comes out clearly when one’s client is accused of a crime and 
presents a defense that seems doubtful.  Sometimes, of course, the client is lying 
to the lawyer.  But sometimes the lawyer simply has to work harder to find the 
truth in the client’s words.  And that is as much a matter of humility—of putting 
oneself in another’s shoes and of restraining one’s incredulity—as it is raw 
analytical ability.  Here the virtue of humility may be seen as part of the popular 
notion of lawyering according to the ethic of friendship.96 
In addition, of course, one must accept the client’s own goals as the goals of 
the representation, even when those goals seem sub-optimal or even foolish.  
When the client really wants to hold on to a relationship, an asset, or a company 
the lawyer thinks not worth the cost, the lawyer’s duty is not to work against the 
client’s goals.  The lawyer often should advise against certain actions because 
of their nature or consequences, but when the goal is within the law, the lawyer, 
in the end, must serve it, or step aside.  To go no further, then, it seems essential 
that a lawyer who seeks to live up to his or her responsibilities, and who seeks 
to be of service to clients, must practice a basic humility in accepting the client 
as that client is found, stories, goals, warts, and all, and serve that client.  This is 
humble work, but no less worthwhile for all that.  Moreover, this lawyer must 
respect and work to preserve the system of law—its processes and the basic 
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coherence of its presumptions—in order to prevent the breakdown of a system 
necessary for the pursuit of justice for his or her clients. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is natural that we yearn for a better existence, in which the pursuit of justice 
replaces that form of instrumentalism that sees sterile formalism as lawyers’ 
only concern.  When one adds the Christian duty to pursue a preference for the 
poor, one can experience a genuine pull toward law as transformation.  But when 
one adds to this a radical political theology one collapses the distinction between 
eschatology and daily practice.  The result is an identification of the good with 
specific political goals, whether presented as the embodiment of heaven or 
merely as “the best we can get” in this life. 
Augustine was aware of the tragic imperfections of legal process in our fallen 
world.  The humility of his vision of law in the City of Man, where self-love is 
the rule, lies at the heart of traditional conceptions of the lawyer’s ethical role.97  
Within the American tradition, with its religious roots, the lawyer had a kind of 
humility forced upon him.  The original Puritans (and some others) wanted to 
dispense with lawyers altogether out of concern that they would foment disputes 
and encourage “going to law.”98  The early role of lawyers consisted of serving 
as an advocate for those who must go to law and as a servant in a public role 
arranging rules and institutions in accordance with a higher law accessible to 
divines and (“the better sort” of) laymen as well as themselves. 
The shift from Augustine to Brougham is a shift from humility to pride—from 
service to existing forms, prudently defending against abuses to the drive to 
transform society into something more perfectly just according to a particular 
ideological vision—whatever the cost to actual persons, including one’s own 
clients.  It also is a shift from acceptance of imperfection to a determination to 
ignore essential aspects of human nature in pursuit of political victory. 
The new lawyers’ ethic is based not just in pride, but also in a self-willed 
ignorance.  An ethic that justifies lying for clients as “evening the score” with 
supposedly unjust structures intentionally ignores the person’s intrinsically 
contextual existence.  Victory for one may mean loss for us all.  It also may mean 
true loss for the client if it means destroying that client’s non-legal interests and 
relationships.  Finally, this focus on victory can be shown to have caused severe 
harm to individual parties in their dealings with powerful actors—including the 
state.  By upping the stakes in court, the rebel lawyer has priced the vast majority 
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of clients out of any chance to an even “fight” with those who can afford more 
skilled and more extensive representation.99 
Aristotle pointed to justice as the highest virtue.  Augustine pointed out that 
justice means the proper order of the soul—and only from that—the proper 
ordering of society.  Such ordering is rooted in the love of God and—from that—
doing justice and charity to one’s neighbor and the commonwealth.  I am easy 
on such terms to sin, either by harming or by failing to help others.100  The 
highest law is indeed the law of love, which we selfish persons disobey regularly.  
That being the case, the “solution” to social injustice is within us and our own 
actions as lawyers and as citizens.  It will not be found in the attempt to make 
over society in our own image of heaven, let alone by twisting the law to our 
own ends.  That way lies the collapse of social order and with it the possibility 
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